atter, World, Nature, the Elements, Material Things. (See
Dieterici, 'Die Philosophic der Araber im X. Jahrhundert n. Chr.,' 2
vols., Leipzig, 1876-79.) In the hands of Ibn Gabirol, this is
transformed thus: God, Will, Primal Matter, Form, Intelligence,
Soul--vegetable, animal, rational, Nature, the source of the visible
world. If we compare these hierarchies, we shall see that Ibn Gabirol
makes two very important changes: _first_, he introduces an altogether
new element, viz., the Will; _second_, instead of placing Intelligence
second in rank, next to God, he puts Will, Matter, and Form before it.
Thus, whereas the earliest thinkers, drawing on Aristotle, had sought
for an explanation of the world in Intelligence, he seeks for it in
Will, thus approaching the standpoint of Schopenhauer. Moreover, whereas
they had made Matter and Form originate in Intelligence, he includes the
latter, together with the material world, among things compounded of
Matter and Form. Hence, everything, save God and His Will, which is but
the expression of Him, is compounded of Matter and Form (cf. Dante,
'Paradiso,' i. 104 _seq_.). Had he concluded from this that God, in
order to occupy this exceptional position, must be pure matter (or
substance), he would have reached the standpoint of Spinoza. As it is,
he stands entirely alone in the Middle Age, in making the world the
product of Will, and not of Intelligence, as the Schoolmen and the
classical philosophers of Germany held.

The 'Fountain of Life' is divided into five books, whose subjects are as
follows:--I. Matter and Form, and their various kinds. II. Matter as the
bearer of body, and the subject of the categories. III. Separate
Substances, in the created intellect, standing between God and the
World. IV. Matter and Form in simple substances. V. Universal Matter and
Universal Form, with a discussion of the Divine Will, which, by
producing and uniting Matter and Form, brings being out of non-being,
and so is the 'Fountain of Life.' Though the author is influenced by
Jewish cosmogony, his system, as such, is almost purely Neo-Platonic. It
remains one of the most considerable attempts that have ever been made
to find in spirit the explanation of the world; not only making all
matter at bottom one, but also maintaining that while form is due to the
divine will, matter is due to the divine essence, so that both are
equally spiritual. It is especially interesting as showing us, by
contrast,