elves
which are opposed to a simple and direct view, to break through the
mechanical imagery in which we have allowed ourselves to be caught; and
it is by awakening other imagery and other habits that we can succeed in
so doing.
But then, you will say, where is the difference between philosophy and
art, between metaphysical and aesthetic intuition? Art also tends to
reveal nature to us, to suggest to us a direct vision of it, to lift the
veil of illusion which hides us from ourselves; and aesthetic intuition
is, in its own way, perception of immediacy. We revive the feeling of
reality obliterated by habit, we summon the deep and penetrating soul of
things: the object is the same in both cases; and the means are also the
same; images and metaphors. Is Mr Bergson only a poet, and does his work
amount to nothing but the introduction of impressionism in metaphysics?
It is an old objection. If the truth be told, Mr Bergson's immense
scientific knowledge should be sufficient refutation.
Only those who have not read the mass of carefully proved and positive
discussions could give way thus to the impressions of art awakened by
what is truly a magic style. But we can go further and put it better.
That there are analogies between philosophy and art, between
metaphysical and aesthetic intuition, is unquestionable and uncontested.
At the same time, the analogies must not be allowed to hide the
differences.
Art is, to a certain extent, philosophy previous to analysis, previous
to criticism and science; the aesthetic intuition is metaphysical
intuition in process of birth, bounded by dream, not proceeding to the
test of positive verification. Reciprocally, philosophy is the art which
follows upon science, and takes account of it, the art which uses the
results of analysis as its material, and submits itself to the demands
of stern criticism; metaphysical intuition is the aesthetic intuition
verified, systematised, ballasted by the language of reason.
Philosophy then differs from art in two essential points: first of all,
it rests upon, envelops, and supposes science; secondly, it implies a
test of verification in its strict meaning. Instead of stopping at the
acts of common-sense, it completes them with all the contributions of
analysis and scientific investigation.
We said just now of common-sense that, in its inmost depths, it
possesses reality: that is only quite exact when we mean common-sense
developed in positi
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