harp the blunt, the
void the full, the full the void, and so of all other things; for the
opposite is the food of the opposite, whereas like receives nothing from
like. And I thought that he who said this was a charming man, and that
he spoke well. What do the rest of you say?

I should say, at first hearing, that he is right, said Menexenus.

Then we are to say that the greatest friendship is of opposites?

Exactly.

Yes, Menexenus; but will not that be a monstrous answer? and will
not the all-wise eristics be down upon us in triumph, and ask, fairly
enough, whether love is not the very opposite of hate; and what answer
shall we make to them--must we not admit that they speak the truth?

We must.

They will then proceed to ask whether the enemy is the friend of the
friend, or the friend the friend of the enemy?

Neither, he replied.

Well, but is a just man the friend of the unjust, or the temperate of
the intemperate, or the good of the bad?

I do not see how that is possible.

And yet, I said, if friendship goes by contraries, the contraries must
be friends.

They must.

Then neither like and like nor unlike and unlike are friends.

I suppose not.

And yet there is a further consideration: may not all these notions of
friendship be erroneous? but may not that which is neither good nor evil
still in some cases be the friend of the good?

How do you mean? he said.

Why really, I said, the truth is that I do not know; but my head
is dizzy with thinking of the argument, and therefore I hazard the
conjecture, that 'the beautiful is the friend,' as the old proverb says.
Beauty is certainly a soft, smooth, slippery thing, and therefore of a
nature which easily slips in and permeates our souls. For I affirm that
the good is the beautiful. You will agree to that?

Yes.

This I say from a sort of notion that what is neither good nor evil is
the friend of the beautiful and the good, and I will tell you why I
am inclined to think so: I assume that there are three principles--the
good, the bad, and that which is neither good nor bad. You would
agree--would you not?

I agree.

And neither is the good the friend of the good, nor the evil of the
evil, nor the good of the evil;--these alternatives are excluded by the
previous argument; and therefore, if there be such a thing as friendship
or love at all, we must infer that what is neither good nor evil must
be the friend, either of the good, or of that whi