art raw recruits, on whom little reliance was to be placed. He
had besides seven hundred men-at-arms and fifteen hundred light horse.
His army, therefore, though, as far as the Italians were concerned,
inferior in discipline to that of his antagonist, was greatly superior
in numbers.[163]
In a council of war that was called, some were of opinion that the
viceroy should act on the defensive, and await the approach of the enemy
in the neighborhood of the capital. But Alva looked on this as a timid
course, arguing distrust in himself, and likely to infuse distrust into
his followers. He determined to march at once against the enemy, and
prevent his gaining a permanent foothold in the kingdom.
Pescara, on the Adriatic, was appointed as the place of rendezvous for
the army, and Alva quitted the city of Naples for that place on the
eleventh of April, 1557. Here he concentrated his whole strength, and
received his artillery and military stores, which were brought to him by
water. Having reviewed his troops, he began his march to the north. On
reaching Rio Umano, he detached a strong body of troops to get
possession of Giulia Nuova, a town of some importance lately seized by
the enemy. Alva supposed, and it seems correctly, that the French
commander had secured this as a good place of retreat in case of his
failure before Civitella, since its position was such as would enable
him readily to keep up his communications with the sea. The French
garrison sallied out against the Spaniards, but were driven back with
loss; and, as Alva's troops followed in their rear, the enemy fled in
confusion through the streets of the city, and left it in the hands of
the victors. In this commodious position, the viceroy for the present
took up his quarters.
On the approach of the Spanish army, the duke of Guise saw the necessity
of bringing his operations against Civitella to a decisive issue. He
accordingly, as a last effort, prepared for a general assault. But,
although it was conducted with great spirit, it was repulsed with still
greater by the garrison; and the French commander, deeply mortified at
his repeated failures, saw the necessity of abandoning the siege. He
could not effect even this without sustaining some loss from the brave
defenders of Civitella, who sallied out on his rear, as he drew off his
discomfited troops to the neighboring valley of Nireto. Thus ended the
siege of Civitella, which, by the confidence it gave to the l
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