ut seven miles from Rangoon, and it was
determined to dislodge them. Colonel S--, who was very partial to the
native troops, was ordered on this service, and he requested
particularly that he might have no troops but the sepoys. Sir A
Campbell did not much like to consent, but, as the stockades were not
higher than breastworks, and the Burmahs not in very great force, he
eventually yielded to the Colonel's arguments. Fifteen hundred sepoys
were ordered out, and the Colonel went on his expedition. The Burmahs
had good intelligence that there were no European troops, and when the
sepoys arrived, they did not wait to be attacked, but attacked the
sepoys, and put them completely to the rout. One half of the sepoys
were said to be killed; the others came back to Rangoon in parties of
ten or twelve, and in the utmost consternation and confusion. Sir A
Campbell was, of course, much annoyed, and the next day a European force
was despatched against the Burmahs. On their arrival they witnessed a
dreadful and disgusting scene. A long avenue had been cut in the wood,
and on each side of it were hung by the heels, at equal distances,
shockingly mutilated, the naked bodies of the seven hundred and fifty
sepoys killed. The Burmahs did not, however, attempt to resist the
European force, but after a few shots made their retreat. Now, this is
a very important fact: and it is a fact which cannot be denied, although
it has not been made known. In India there is a nominal force of three
hundred thousand men; but they are scattered over such a vast extent of
territory, that, allowing they could be made disposable, which they
could not, it would require many months before they could be collected,
and if the Burmahs despise the sepoys, and the sepoys dread the Burmahs,
the only check against the latter will be the European troops; and of
them how many can be called out. Not ten thousand, at the very utmost;
and the difficulty of collecting them was well known at the commencement
of the Burmah war. There certainly is a great difference between
attacking others in their own territories, and defending ourselves; but
if the Burmahs could hold out against us, as they did, for nearly three
years, without arms to cope with us, what might be the consequence if
they were supplied with arms and officers by any other nation? We have
now a footing in the country, and it must be our object to prevent the
ingress of any other, and to keep the Bu