of Great
Britain; we are desirous of being furnished with a copy. It is with
pleasure we read your assurance of sending the soldiers' clothing, and
other materials for the army, in time to meet the approaching cold
season; they will be greatly wanted.

As the small successes the enemy have met with this year will probably
support the hopes of a vindictive Court, and occasion the straining of
every nerve for the accomplishment of its tyrannic views, we doubt not
your most strenuous exertions to prevent Great Britain from obtaining
Russian or German auxiliaries for the next campaign; and we think,
with you, that it is an object of the greatest importance to cultivate
and secure the friendship of his Prussian Majesty, as well for the
preventing this evil, as for obtaining his public recognition of our
independence, and leave of his ports for the purposes of commerce, and
disposal of prizes.

The original papers, which you mention, in a triplicate, to have sent,
never came to hand; so that we can only make conjectures as to the
disposition of that monarch. The marine force of the enemy is so
considerable in these seas, and so over proportionate to our infant
navy, that it seems quite necessary and wise to send our ships to
distress the commerce of our enemies in other parts of the world. For
this purpose, the Marine Committee have already ordered some vessels
to France, under your direction as to their future operations, and
more, we expect, will be sent. But our frigates are not capable of
carrying much bulky commodity for commercial purposes, without
unfitting them for war; besides, there is the consideration of our
being obliged to get them away, how, and when we can, or endanger
their being taken, which prevents our sending them to those staple
Colonies, where the commodities wanted are to be obtained. The
reciprocal benefits of commerce cannot flow from, or to North America,
until some maritime power in Europe will aid our cause with marine
strength. And this circumstance gives us pain, lest it should be
construed as unwillingness on our part to pay our debts, when the
truth is, that we have the greatest desire of doing so, have materials
in abundance, but not the means of conveying them.

This leads us to reflect on the great advantages, which must
unavoidably accrue to all parties, if France, or Spain, were to afford
effectual aid on the sea, by the loan or sale of ships of war,
according to the former propositi