e to a second leviathan, that
of Eastern Europe and Northern Asia, the world's interest was deeply
stirred again.

Would little Japan dare attack a European power and one so great and
populous as Russia, with half Asia already in its clasp, with strong
fortresses and fleets within striking distance, and with a continental
railway over which it could pour thousands of armed battalions? The idea
seemed preposterous, many looked upon the attitude of Japan as the
madness of temerity, and when on February 6, 1904, the echo of the guns
at Port Arthur was heard the world gave a gasp of astonishment and
alarm.

Were there any among us then who believed it possible for little Japan
to triumph over the colossus it had so daringly attacked? If any, they
were very few. It is doubtful if there was a man in Russia itself who
dreamed of anything but eventual victory, with probably the adding of
the islands of Japan to its chaplet of orient pearls. True, the success
of the attack on their fleet was a painful surprise, and when they saw
their great iron-clads locked up in Port Arthur harbor it was cause for
annoyance. But if the fleet had been taken by surprise, the fortress was
claimed to be impregnable, the army was powerful and accustomed to
victory over its foes in Asia, and it was with an amused contempt of
their half-barbarian foes and confidence in rapid and brilliant triumph
that the Muscovite cohorts streamed across Asia with arms in hand and
hope in heart.

We do not propose to tell here what followed. The world knows it. Men
read with an interest they had rarely taken in foreign affairs of the
rapid and stupendous successes of the little soldiers of Nippon, the
indomitable valor of the troops, the striking skill of their leaders,
the breadth and completeness of their tactics, the training and
discipline of the men, the rare hygienic condition of the camps, their
impetuosity in attack, their persistence in pursuit; in short, the
sudden advent of an army with all the requisites of a victorious career,
as pitted against the ill-handled myriads of Russia, not wanting in
brute courage, but sadly lacking in efficient leadership and strategical
skill in their commanders.

Back went the Russian hosts, mile by mile, league by league, steadily
pressed northward by the unrelenting persistence of the island warriors;
while on the Liao-tung peninsula the besieging forces crept on foot by
foot, caring apparently nothing for wounds or