en the
initiative, and who had presumably chosen their own time for the
opening of hostilities, did not immediately take full advantage of
their favorable situation has caused much surprise among impartial
military critics. On the same day that they declared war they had
the opportunity to hurl their troops across the Danube and take
Belgrade with practically no opposition. Apparently they were not
ready; from that moment the difficulties that would have attended
such a movement increased hourly.

A force of 20,000 men was raised almost immediately for the defense
of Belgrade. To meet this opposition the Austrians had, on the
evening of the day war was declared, July 18, 1914, only one division
concentrated between Semlin and Pancsova, opposite Belgrade--a force
that was hardly sufficient to take the Serbian capital. Two days
later an army corps would have been needed for the enterprise, for
by this time the Serbian army had begun concentrating considerable
numbers within striking distance of the capital. Thus the first
opportunity was lost by the tardiness of the Austrians to act.

It is presumed that the reader has already studied the description
of this theatre of the war presented elsewhere in this work. Aside
from that, the movements that follow should only be traced with
the aid of a map. Written words are inadequate to give a concrete
picture of the field of operations.

The Austrian General Staff realized the difficulties of crossing
the Danube. Its general plan, probably prepared long before,
contemplated a main attack that should begin from another quarter.

The Austro-Serbian frontier, almost 340 miles in extent, is formed
on the north by the Save as well as by the Danube, and on the east
and southeast by the Drina River. These two smaller streams abound
in convenient fords, especially in summer. To many of these points on
the northeastern frontier Austria had already constructed strategic
railways. Moreover, the Austrian territory throughout this section is
so mountainous and well timbered that large forces of troops could
be well screened from observation, whereas the country opposite
Belgrade is fiat and bane.

It was from this direction that the Serbian General Staff expected
the first advance of the enemy. And yet there were dozens of other
points where an attack in force was possible. Each must be covered
with a force at least strong enough to hold the enemy back long
enough to enable the forces