egiments upon whom I had to depend,
so that I had now no difficulty in disposing the troops in the manner
most likely to ensure success.

For the turning movement I selected:

4 guns F/A, R.H.A.,
The wing 72nd Highlanders,
No 1 Mountain Battery (4 guns),
2nd and 29th Punjab Infantry,
5th Gurkhas,
23rd Pioneers--
Total strength 2,263 men with 8 guns;

and I determined to command the attack myself, with Brigadier-General
Thelwall as second in command.

For the feint and for the defence of our camp I left under the command
of Brigadier-General Cobbe:

2 guns F/A, R.H.A.,
3 guns G/3, R.A.,
2nd Battalion 8th Foot,[6]
12th Bengal Cavalry,
5th Punjab Infantry.

In all, a little more than 1,000 men with 5 guns.

At 10 p.m. on Sunday, the 1st December, the little column fell in,
in absolute silence, and began its hazardous march. Tents were left
standing and camp-fires burning; and so noiselessly were orders
carried out that our departure remained unsuspected even by those of
our own people who were left in camp.

The track (for there was no road) led for two miles due east, and
then, turning sharp to the north, entered a wide gorge and ran along
the bed of a mountain stream. The moonlight lit up the cliffs on the
eastern side of the ravine, but made the darkness only the more dense
in the shadow of the steep hills on the west, underneath which our
path lay, over piles of stones and heaps of glacier debris. A bitterly
cold wind rushed down the gorge, extremely trying to all, lightly clad
as we were in anticipation of the climb before us. Onward and upwards
we slowly toiled, stumbling over great boulders of rock, dropping
into old water-channels, splashing through icy streams, and halting
frequently to allow the troops in the rear to close up.

In spite of the danger incurred, I was obliged every now and then to
strike a match and look at my watch to see how the time was going. I
had calculated that, by starting as early as ten o'clock, there would
be an hour or two to spare for rest. The distance, however, proved
rather greater than was expected and the road much rougher, but these
facts were, to my mind, not sufficient to account for the slowness of
our progress, and I proceeded to the head of the column, anxious to
discover the true cause of the delay.

I had chosen the 29th Punjab Infantry to lead the way, on account of
the high reputation of Colonel John Gordon, who commanded it, an