ght to do, I cannot see why Congress has not now the
same power and authority to inflict the same punishment upon the State
for doing or permitting to be done what it now has no legal and
constitutional right to do.

No State, in my opinion, should be allowed to take advantage of its own
wrongs, and thus, by a wrongful act, augment its own power and influence
in the government. To allow a majority of the white men in the State of
Mississippi, for instance, to appropriate to themselves through
questionable methods the representative strength of the colored
population of that State, excluding the latter from all participation in
the selection of the representatives in Congress, is a monstrous wrong,
the continuance of which should not be tolerated.

For every crime there must be a punishment; for every wrong there must
be a remedy, and for every grievance there must be a redress. That this
state of things is wrong and unjust, if not unlawful, no fair-minded
person will deny. It is not only wrong and unjust to the colored people
of the State, who are thus denied a voice in the government under which
they live and to support which they are taxed, but it also involves a
grave injustice to the States in which the laws are obeyed and the
National Constitution,--including the war amendments to the same,--is
respected and enforced. I am aware of the fact that it is claimed by
those who are responsible for what is here complained of that, while
the acts referred to may be an evasion if not a violation of the spirit
of the Constitution, yet, since they do not violate the letter of the
Constitution the complaining parties are without a remedy, and therefore
have no redress. This contention is not only weak in logic but unsound
in law, even as construed by the Supreme Court of the United States,
which tribunal seems to be the last to which an appeal can be
successfully made, having for its object the enforcement of the
Constitution and laws so far as they relate to the political and civil
rights of the colored Americans. That a State can do by indirection what
it cannot do directly, is denied even by the Supreme Court of the United
States.

That doctrine was clearly and distinctly set forth in a decision of the
Court rendered by Mr. Justice Strong, which was concurred in by a
majority of his associates. In that decision it was held that
affirmative State action is not necessary to constitute race
discrimination by the State. In o