he came to California, encouraged them, and, as was
generally reported and believed, in consideration of a portion of the
land to be given to him in case of success, undertook to defend their
possessions.[1]
When Frisbie applied, under the provisions of the act of Congress,
for a patent to the land, a man named Whitney, one of the squatters,
protested against its issue, on the ground that under the pre-emption
laws he, Whitney, having settled upon the land, had acquired a vested
right, of which Congress could not deprive him. But the Land Department
took a different view of the matter and issued the patent to Frisbie.
Whitney thereupon commenced a suit against Frisbie in the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia to have him declared a trustee of
the land thus patented, and to compel him, as such trustee, to execute
a conveyance to the complainant. The Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia decided the case in favor of Whitney, and ordered Frisbie to
execute a conveyance; but on appeal to the Supreme Court the decision
was reversed; and it was held that a pre-emptioner did not acquire any
vested right as against the United States by making his settlement,
nor until he had complied with all the requirements of the law,
including the payment of the purchase-money; and that until then
Congress could reserve the land from settlement, appropriate it to the
uses of the government, or make any other disposition thereof which it
pleased. The court, therefore, adjudged that the Suscol act was valid,
that the purchasers from Vallejo had the first right of entry, and
that Frisbie was accordingly the owner of the land purchased by him.
Soon after the decision was rendered Julian rose in his seat in the
House of Representatives and denounced it as a second Dred Scott
decision, and applied to the members of the court remarks that were
anything but complimentary. It so happened that previous to this
decision a similar suit had been decided in favor of Frisbie by
the Supreme Court of California, in which a very able and elaborate
opinion was rendered by the Chief Justice. I did not see the opinion
until long after it was delivered, and had nothing whatever to do
with it; but in some way or other, utterly inexplicable to me, it was
rumored that I had been consulted by the Chief Justice with respect
to that case, and that the decision had been made through my
instrumentality. With this absurd rumor Hastings, after he had been
dis
|