he state to
be overpaid. The service of the public is a thing which cannot be put to
auction and struck down to those who will agree to execute it the
cheapest. When the proportion between reward and service is our object,
we must always consider of what nature the service is, and what sort of
men they are that must perform it. What is just payment for one kind of
labor, and full encouragement for one kind of talents, is fraud and
discouragement to others. Many of the great offices have much duty to
do, and much expense of representation to maintain. A Secretary of
State, for instance, must not appear sordid in the eyes of the ministers
of other nations; neither ought our ministers abroad to appear
contemptible in the courts where they reside. In all offices of duty,
there is almost necessarily a great neglect of all domestic affairs. A
person in high office can rarely take a view of his family-house. If he
sees that the state takes no detriment, the state must see that his
affairs should take as little.

I will even go so far as to affirm, that, if men were willing to serve
in such situations without salary, they ought not to be permitted to do
it. Ordinary service must be secured by the motives to ordinary
integrity. I do not hesitate to say that that state which lays its
foundation in rare and heroic virtues will be sure to have its
superstructure in the basest profligacy and corruption. An honorable and
fair profit is the best security against avarice and rapacity; as in all
things else, a lawful and regulated enjoyment is the best security
against debauchery and excess. For as wealth is power, so all power will
infallibly draw wealth to itself by some means or other; and when men
are left no way of ascertaining their profits but by their means of
obtaining them, those means will be increased to infinity. This is true
in all the parts of administration, as well as in the whole. If any
individual were to decline his appointments, it might give an unfair
advantage to ostentatious ambition over unpretending service; it might
breed invidious comparisons; it might tend to destroy whatever little
unity and agreement may be found among ministers. And, after all, when
an ambitious man had run down his competitors by a fallacious show of
disinterestedness, and fixed himself in power by that means, what
security is there that he would not change his course, and claim as an
indemnity ten times more than he has given up?

Thi