storm the
front positions, but retreated in the direction of our camp, a quarter
of a mile in among the trees. There Veld-Kornet Klaassen ordered his men
to off-saddle and give the horses a rest. Meanwhile the camp was burnt,
flames arose in all directions, and thousands of cartridges exploded.

After we had watered our horses in a neighbouring spruit we lay down to
rest. But ere long General De la Rey came galloping into our midst with
a lash in his hand, calling to us whether we were not ashamed to lie
there doing nothing, instead of following up our advantage now that we
had the chance, when otherwise the enemy would ill-treat our women and
children and burn down our homes. One of our corporals rather
impertinently informed De la Rey that he served under another General,
and would obey no orders but his. De la Rey thereupon rode up to him and
gave him a heavy cut with his lash. I went up to the General, and told
him that we were quite willing to fight, and had only off-saddled for a
rest by order of our Field-Cornet. In his rage he lifted his lash, but,
recognising me, lowered it again. If I had aimed at getting a cut from
him, I might have called out like the Dutch farmers, who got a box on
the ear from Peter the Great for pressing too closely upon him while he
was building ships at Zaandam: 'I have had one too! I have had one too!'
We then rode with the General to the burnt camp. The enemy had not found
the game worth the candle, and had saved their shell for a more
favourable occasion.

One can imagine De la Rey's indignation when he saw that waggons,
provisions, and ammunition were nearly all burnt. He pointed out to us
how ammunition and guns were required on every side. General Beyers,
whom we met there, excused himself by explaining that he had ordered
only those things to be burnt that we did not require. We then rode to
the other positions on the opposite side of the camp, but the enemy were
in full flight, followed by an occasional burgher.

I do not consider myself able to criticise the manner in which our
officers organized this battle. But it was easy to see that a great
mistake had been made. We had much to be thankful for, but the result
might have been more advantageous to us. The whole camp with all its
cannon should have been taken with a smaller loss than eighty men killed
and wounded.

I do not know the number of the enemy's killed and wounded. If our first
attack had been made unanimously an