Ala.,
Va.); a prescriptive qualification, under which are included all male
persons who were entitled to vote on January 1, 1867, at which date the
Negro had not yet been given the right to vote; a hereditary
qualification, (the so-called "grandfather" clause), whereby any son
(Va.), or descendant (Ala.), of a soldier, and (N.C.) the descendant of
any person who had the right to vote on January 1, 1867, inherits that
right. If the voter wish to take advantage of these last provisions, which
are in the nature of exceptions to a general rule, he must register within
a stated time, whereupon he becomes a member of a privileged class of
permanently enrolled voters not subject to any of the other restrictions.

It will be seen that these restrictions are variously combined in the
different States, and it is apparent that if combined to their declared
end, practically every Negro may, under color of law, be denied the right
to vote, and practically every white man accorded that right. The
effectiveness of these provisions to exclude the Negro vote is proved by
the Alabama registration under the new State Constitution. Out of a total,
by the census of 1900, of 181,471 Negro "males of voting age," less than
3,000 are registered; in Montgomery county alone, the seat of the State
capital, where there are 7,000 Negro males of voting age, only 47 have
been allowed to register, while in several counties not one single Negro
is permitted to exercise the franchise.

These methods of disfranchisement have stood such tests as the United
States Courts, including the Supreme Court, have thus far seen fit to
apply, in such cases as have been before them for adjudication. These
include a case based upon the "understanding" clause of the Mississippi
Constitution, in which the Supreme Court held, in effect, that since there
was no ambiguity in the language employed and the Negro was not directly
named, the Court would not go behind the wording of the Constitution to
find a meaning which discriminated against the colored voter; and the
recent case of Jackson vs. Giles, brought by a colored citizen of
Montgomery, Alabama, in which the Supreme Court confesses itself impotent
to provide a remedy for what, by inference, it acknowledges _may_ be a
"great political wrong," carefully avoiding, however, to state that it is
a wrong, although the vital prayer of the petition was for a decision upon
this very point.

Now, what is the effect of this who