t of duty which is embraced in the contract may vary very
much. It may be only for the performance of one single act, or it may
be for almost the whole range of daily avocations and duties. There is
often a vagueness about the limit of duties, and we often find the
master inclined to exact more than the servant is inclined to give.
There are very good reasons why masters should not consider themselves
as having a right to a full command and power over their servants in
all things; nay, that in things not within the contract, they should
be inclined to admit a certain equality in the two parties. Masters
are too apt to regard themselves as the lords of their servants in all
respects and at all times. They exercise an authority and assume a
superiority in matters beyond the contract.
On their side, servants often grudgingly perform the duties they have
undertaken. These two causes of discontent produce the worst results.
The practical remedy seems to be, that masters ought more generally to
recognise and act on the principle, that the lordship they bargain for
is not of the whole man, but only in certain respects and duties; and
that it is only as regards those duties they can expect their servant
to surrender his will to the guidance of his master's: while it should
be equally impressed on the servant, that in those respects in which
he has agreed to submit to and execute the will of his master, that
submission and surrender of his will should be absolute, and without
the least reserve or limitation. Perfect obedience is a beautiful
fulfilment of duty, and defensible on the grounds of common-sense; for
as no one can serve two masters--that is, in the performance of any
particular duty--so no man can both obey his own inclination and
submit himself to his master's will in the performance of the same
act.
On moral grounds, it is improper that any one should attempt to
execute in all things the will, of any earthly master; for there is a
power, and, in most cases, several powers, superior to both master and
servant, to whom both owe duties; and therefore the servant cannot
legally, nor without failure in his higher duties, enter into any
contract which may hinder the performance of those duties. In matters
of the law, it is held that such a contract is not binding; and thus,
in the case of a moral law being contravened by a contract, a door of
escape is open to those who have entered into such contract, it being
in op
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