f reality which
it regards as the _sine qua non_ of truth. Hence, if disinterestedness
is the condition of knowing, knowledge is impossible. And it is so
entangled in its unintelligible theory of truth as a copying of reality
that, rather than renounce it, when it finds that human knowing is _not_
copying, it prefers a surrender to Scepticism.

Yet is not its whole procedure a signal example of human arbitrariness
and perversity? We professed to be impelled by logical necessity at
every step, but were free to escape from all our perplexities by
adopting the pragmatic inferences from them. The Pragmatic Method of
observing the consequences readily suggests the means of discriminating
between truth and error, of sifting values and of testing claims. And,
though not infallible, it is adequate to all our needs. The pragmatic
notion that _Truth is practical_ closes the artificial gulf between the
theoretic and the practical side of life, and assigns to truth a
biological function and vital value. The humanist contention that _Truth
is human_ rescues man from the despondency in which his failure to grasp
absolute truth had left him. The Protagorean dictum that _Man is the
measure of all things_ assures him that _his_ knowledge may become
adequate to _his_ reality, and that the value of truths and the
differences between truth and error also are susceptible of estimation.

True, this policy averts the bankruptcy of the intellect by scaling down
the intolerable charges on it. True, practical knowledge is not
absolute; but if it is enough to live by, is it not better to live by it
than to be lured on to perish in the deserts of Scepticism by the
_mirage_ of an absolute truth not humanly attainable? True, verification
is not 'proof,' but as its conclusions are not incorrigible, its defects
are not fatal, and its demands are not impracticable. True, no truth and
no reality are wholly 'objective,' in the sense of wholly indifferent to
our action; but to say that the human and 'subjective' factor in all
knowledge must be taken into account does not preclude our apprehending
and measuring an 'objective' world as real as, and more knowable than,
any other theory can offer.

Thus the proposals of Pragmatism for reconstructing the business of the
intellect, and rescuing it from the bankruptcy of Intellectualism, are
not unreasonable. They open out to it a prospect of recovering its
credit and its usefulness by returning to the service