good.

With respect to the organization of the legislative power, different
modes have been adopted in different countries. In America it is
generally composed of two houses. In France it consists but of one, but
in both countries, it is wholly by representation.

The case is, that mankind (from the long tyranny of assumed power) have
had so few opportunities of making the necessary trials on modes and
principles of government, in order to discover the best, that government
is but now beginning to be known, and experience is yet wanting to
determine many particulars.

The objections against two houses are, first, that there is an
inconsistency in any part of a whole legislature, coming to a final
determination by vote on any matter, whilst that matter, with respect
to that whole, is yet only in a train of deliberation, and consequently
open to new illustrations.

Secondly, That by taking the vote on each, as a separate body, it always
admits of the possibility, and is often the case in practice, that the
minority governs the majority, and that, in some instances, to a degree
of great inconsistency.

Thirdly, That two houses arbitrarily checking or controlling each other
is inconsistent; because it cannot be proved on the principles of just
representation, that either should be wiser or better than the other.
They may check in the wrong as well as in the right therefore to give
the power where we cannot give the wisdom to use it, nor be assured
of its being rightly used, renders the hazard at least equal to the
precaution.*[21]

The objection against a single house is, that it is always in a
condition of committing itself too soon.--But it should at the same
time be remembered, that when there is a constitution which defines the
power, and establishes the principles within which a legislature
shall act, there is already a more effectual check provided, and more
powerfully operating, than any other check can be. For example,

Were a Bill to be brought into any of the American legislatures similar
to that which was passed into an act by the English parliament, at
the commencement of George the First, to extend the duration of the
assemblies to a longer period than they now sit, the check is in the
constitution, which in effect says, Thus far shalt thou go and no
further.

But in order to remove the objection against a single house (that of
acting with too quick an impulse), and at the same time to avoid the
inco