usand_, almost all of whom, save those killed on the first
of July, were buried by us--the enemy not having them in their
possession. In looking at a great number of tables of killed and
wounded in battles I have found that the proportion of the killed to the
wounded is as _one_ to _five_, or more than five, rarely less than five.
So with the killed at the number stated, _twenty-five thousand_
mentioned. I think _fourteen thousand_ of the enemy, wounded and
unwounded, fell into our hands. Great numbers of his small arms, two or
three guns, and forty or more--was there ever such bannered harvest?--of
his regimental battle-flags, were captured by us. Some day possibly we
may learn the enemy's loss, but I doubt if he will ever tell truly how
many flags he did not take home with him. I have great confidence
however in my estimates, for they have been carefully made, and after
much inquiry, and with no desire or motive to overestimate the enemy's
loss.

The magnitude of the armies engaged, the number of the casualties, the
object sought by the Rebel, the result, will all contribute to give
Gettysburg a place among the great historic battles of the world. That
General Meade's concentration was rapid--over thirty miles a day was
marched by some of the Corps--that his position was skillfully selected
and his dispositions good; that he fought the battle hard and well;
that his victory was brilliant and complete, I think all should admit. I
cannot but regard it as highly fortunate to us and commendable in
General Meade, that the enemy was allowed the initiative, the offensive,
in the main battle; that it was much better to allow the Rebel, for his
own destruction, to come up and smash his lines and columns upon the
defensive solidity of our position, than it would have been to hunt him,
for the same purpose, in the woods, or to unearth him from his
rifle-pits. In this manner our losses were lighter, and his heavier,
than if the case had been reversed. And whatever the books may say of
troops fighting the better who make the attack, I am satisfied that in
this war, Americans, the Rebels, as well as ourselves, are best on the
defensive. The proposition is deducible from the battles of the war, I
think, and my own observation confirms it.

But men there are who think that nothing was gained or done well in this
battle, because some other general did not have the command, or because
any portion of the army of the enemy was permitted