ns
have of_ RECOMMENDING THEMSELVES TO THEIR SOVEREIGN. Nothing therefore
could be more fatal to _English_ Liberty (and to _American_ Liberty in the
Issue) than the Adoption of the Idea, cherished by the _Americans_, of
having distinct independent Assemblies of their own, who should treat
immediately with the King, and grant him Subsidies, to the utter
Annihilation of the Power of those antient, and hitherto successful
Assertors of general Liberty, the _British_ Parliament."

To these Reflections in this and in other Parts of his Book, the judicious
Author adds many striking Examples, particularly the present State of the
Want of Liberty in _France_ and _Spain_, by way of confirming and
corroborating his Argument. But in my humble Opinion there is still a more
forcible Example to be drawn from the Case of the hereditary Dominions of
the House of _Austria_. For it is well known, that the Princes of that
House rule in as absolute a Manner over every Part of their vast
Possessions as the Sovereigns either of _France_ or _Spain_; and yet there
are States (answering to our Parliaments) in almost every Country
belonging to the _Austrian_ Dominions; nay, these States are frequently
summoned to meet together; which is not the Case with the _general
national Assemblies of France_, or with the _Cortes_ of _Spain_. How then
comes it to pass,--that such Meetings produce little or no Effects in
regard to the obtaining of a _reasonable_ Degree of Liberty for the
Subject, which every Subject, if in his right Senses, wishes to obtain?
The Reason is obvious:--There are a Multitude of little States or
Parliaments within the Territories of the House of _Austria_;--the States
of _Austria_ (not to mention the several still lesser States in the
_Netherlands_) the States of _Bohemia_, States of _Hungary_, of
_Transilvania_, _Stiria_, _Carinthia_, _Carniola_, &c. &c. But all these
petty States, or Parliaments being totally independent of, and
consequently _Competitors_ with, and _Rivals_ to each other, never can act
in Concert, or pursue one general Plan, or attend to one _common
Interest_:--So that the Power of the Prince, which would have been too
weak to have contended with them all, if all had been UNITED (like the
Parliament of _Great-Britain_) in _one compact, and general
Body_,--becomes an _Over-match_ for any one of them singly and disjointed
from the rest:--And this is the true Reason, why the House of _Austria_
governs all her Provin