concentrated his army
at Altamont and then at MacMinnville. Bragg marched unopposed up the
Sequatchie Valley to Sparta. General George H. Thomas had advised Buell to
occupy Sparta, but the advice was rejected. Buell could not, or would not,
see that Kentucky was Bragg's objective point. He now believed that
Nashville or Murfreesboro was the point of danger, and he concentrated his
army at the latter place.

From Sparta General Bragg had marched to Carthage, crossed the Cumberland
River, and was well on his way to Kentucky before Buell waked up. Bragg
was then three days ahead of him. If Bragg had marched straight for
Louisville, there would have been no troops to oppose him until he reached
that place, and Louisville would have fallen. But he stopped to take
Mumfordsville, and the delay was fatal. It gave Buell the opportunity to
overtake him.

When the forward movement began, Colonel John H. Morgan was ordered to
Eastern Kentucky to watch the force at Cumberland Gap and prevent it from
falling on the rear of the army of General Smith. Smith moved rapidly, and
on August 29 fought the battle of Richmond, where a Federal force of seven
thousand was almost annihilated, only about eight hundred escaping.

By the movements of Smith and Bragg the Federal force at Cumberland Gap
was cut off. For that army the situation was a grave one. In their front
was General Stevenson with a force too small to attack, but large enough
to keep them from advancing. In their rear were the Confederate armies.
They were short of food; starvation stared them in the face. It was either
surrender or a retreat through the mountains of Eastern Kentucky.

General George W. Morgan called a council of his officers, and it was
decided to evacuate the Gap and attempt the retreat. The Gap was evacuated
on the night of the 17th of September. All government property which could
not be carried away was given to the flames. The rough mountain road had
been mined, and the mines were exploded to prevent Stevenson from
following. But as Stevenson's force was infantry, it would be of little
avail in following the retreating Federals.

A toilsome march of two hundred and twenty miles over rough mountainous
roads lay between the Federals and the Ohio River. To the credit of
General G. W. Morgan be it said, he conducted the retreat with consummate
skill. It was expected that a Confederate force in Eastern Kentucky under
General Humphrey Marshall would try to cu