ed, and yet this bill proposes, if they
are still denied in any State whose courts have been interrupted by
the rebellion, the military protection of the Government shall be
extended over the person who is thus denied such civil rights or
immunities.

"The next section of the bill provides punishments where any of these
things are done, where any right is denied to a colored man which
under State law is allowed to a white man. The language is very vague,
and it is very difficult to say what this section will mean. If it has
as broad a construction as is attempted to be given to the second
section of the constitutional amendment, I would not undertake to
guess what it means. Any man who shall deny to any colored man any
civil rights secured to white persons, shall be liable to be taken
before the officers of this bureau and to be punished according to the
provisions of this section. In the first place, now that peace is
restored, now that there is no war, now that men are no longer under
military rule, but are under civil rule, I want to know how such a
court can be organized; how it is that the citizen may be arrested
without indictment, and may be brought before the officers of this
bureau and tried without a jury, tried without the forms which the
Constitution requires.

"But sir, this section is most objectionable in regard to the offense
that it defines. If any portion of the law ought to be certain, it is
that which defines crime and prescribes the punishment. What is meant
by this general expression, 'the deprivation of any civil right
secured to white persons?' The agent in one State may construe it to
mean one thing, and the agent in another State another thing. It is
broad and comprehensive--'the deprivation of any civil right secured
to white persons.' That act of deprivation is the crime that is to be
punished. Take the case that I have just referred to. Suppose a
minister, when called upon, should refuse to solemnize a marriage
between a colored man and a white woman because the law of the State
forbade it, would he then, refusing to recognize a civil right which
is enjoyed by white persons, be liable to this punishment?

"My judgment is that, under the second section of the constitutional
amendment, we may pass such a law as will secure the freedom declared
in the first section, but that we can not go beyond that limitation.
If a man has been, by this provision of the Constitution, made free
from his ma