It has
often been observed that the strength of Stoicism resided not in its
canons of conduct, which were often repulsive or ridiculous, but in
the great though vague principle which it inculcated of resistance to
passion. Just in the same way the influence on jurisprudence of the
Greek theories, which had their most distinct expression in Stoicism,
consisted not in the number of specific positions which they
contributed to Roman law, but in the single fundamental assumption
which they lent to it. After nature had become a household word in the
mouths of the Romans, the belief gradually prevailed among the Roman
lawyers that the old Jus Gentium was in fact the lost code of Nature,
and that the Praetor in framing an Edictal jurisprudence on the
principles of the Jus Gentium was gradually restoring a type from
which law had only departed to deteriorate. The inference from this
belief was immediate, that it was the Praetor's duty to supersede the
Civil Law as much as possible by the Edict, to revive as far as might
be the institutions by which Nature had governed man in the primitive
state. Of course, there were many impediments to the amelioration of
law by this agency. There may have been prejudices to overcome even in
the legal profession itself, and Roman habits were far too tenacious
to give way at once to mere philosophical theory. The indirect methods
by which the Edict combated certain technical anomalies, show the
caution which its authors were compelled to observe, and down to the
very days of Justinian there was some part of the old law which had
obstinately resisted its influence. But, on the whole, the progress of
the Romans in legal improvement was astonishingly rapid as soon as
stimulus was applied to it by the theory of Natural Law. The ideas of
simplification and generalisation had always been associated with the
conception of Nature; simplicity, symmetry, and intelligibility came
therefore to be regarded as the characteristics of a good legal
system, and the taste for involved language, multiplied ceremonials,
and useless difficulties disappeared altogether. The strong will, and
unusual opportunities of Justinian were needed to bring the Roman law
to its existing shape, but the ground plan of the system had been
sketched long before the imperial reforms were effected.

What was the exact point of contact between the old Jus Gentium and
the Law of Nature? I think that they touch and blend through AEquitas,