ess fully convinced, but on which
all men are _not_ agreed? The author has accordingly been solicited to
endeavour to frame some canons which may furnish a standard for
determining what evidence is to be received.

This he conceives to be impracticable, except to that extent to which
it is accomplished by a sound system of Logic; including under that
title, a portion--that which relates to the "Laws of Evidence"--of
what is sometimes treated under the head of "Rhetoric." But the full
and complete accomplishment of such an object would confer on Man the
unattainable attribute of infallibility.

But the difficulty complained of, he conceives to arise, in many
instances, from men's _mis-stating the grounds of their own
conviction_. They are convinced, indeed, and perhaps with very
sufficient reason; but they imagine this reason to be a different one
from what it is. The evidence to which they have assented is applied
to their minds in a different manner from that in which they believe
that it is--and suppose that it ought to be--applied. And when
challenged to defend and justify their own belief, they feel at a
loss, because they are attempting to maintain a position which is
not, in fact, that in which their force lies.

For a development of the nature, the consequences, and the remedies of
this mistake, the reader is referred to "Hinds on Inspiration," pp.
30-46. If such a development is to be found in any earlier works, the
Author of the following pages at least has never chanced to meet with
any attempt of the kind.[2]

It has been objected, again, by some persons of no great logical
accuracy of thought, that as there would not be any _moral blame_
imputable to one who should seriously disbelieve, or doubt, the
existence of Buonaparte, so neither is a rejection of the
Scripture-histories to be considered as implying anything morally
culpable.

The same objection, such as it is, would apply equally to many of the
Parables of the New Testament. It might be said, for instance, that as
a woman who should decline taking the trouble of searching for her
lost "piece of silver," or a merchant who should neglect making an
advantageous purchase of a "goodly pearl," would be guilty of no moral
wrong, it must follow that there is nothing morally wrong in
neglecting to reclaim a lost sinner, or in rejecting the Gospel, &c.

But any man of common sense readily perceives that the force of these
parables consists in the circum