nd he was quite willing to try
negotiation. His ambassadors should accompany Monasses. They would be
instructed to demand nothing of Phraates but the restoration of the
Roman standards taken from Crassus, and the liberation of such of the
captive soldiers as were still living.'
But Antony had really determined on war. It may be doubted whether it
had required the overtures of Monseses to put a Parthian expedition into
his thoughts. He must have been either more or less than a man if the
successes of his lieutenants had not stirred in his mind some feeling of
jealousy, and some desire to throw their victories into the shade by a
grand and noble achievement. Especially the glory of Ventidius, who had
been allowed the much-coveted honor of a triumph at Rome on account of
his defeats of the Parthians in Cilicia and Syria, must have moved
him to emulation, and have caused him to cast about for some means of
exalting his own military reputation above that of his subordinates.
For this purpose nothing, he must have known, would be so effectual as
a real Parthian success, the inflicting on this hated and dreaded foe
of an unmistakable humiliation, the dictating to them terms of peace on
their own soil after some crushing and overwhelming disaster. And, after
the victories of Ventidius, this did not appear to be so very difficult.
The prestige of the Parthian name was gone. Roman soldiers could be
trusted to meet them without alarm, and to contend with them without
undue excitement or flurry. The weakness, as well as the strength, of
their military system had come to be known; and expedients had been
devised by which its strong points were met and counterbalanced. At the
head of sixteen legions, Antony might well think that he could invade
Parthia successfully, and not only avoid the fate of Crassus, but gather
laurels which might serve him in good stead in his contest with his
great political rival.
Nor can the Roman general be taxed with undue precipitation or with
attacking in insufficient force. He had begun, as already noticed, with
securing the co-operation of the Armenian king, Artavasdes, who promised
him a contingent of 7000 foot and 6000 horse. His Roman infantry is
estimated at 60,000; besides which he had 10,000 Gallic and Iberian
horse, and 30,000 light armed and cavalry of the Asiatic allies. His own
army thus amounted to 100,000 men; and, with the Armenian contingent,
his entire force would have been 113,000. I
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