was intentional but
not premeditated, an injustice when premeditated. An act _prima facie_
unjust is not so if done with the free consent of the person injured. It
is the agent of distribution, not the recipient, who is unjust (when
they are different persons); and similarly, the agent, not the
instrument. And even the agent of unjust distribution is not really
unjust unless he was really actuated by motives of personal gain.

The performance of a particular act is easy. To perform it rightly as
the outcome of a right habit, is not; nor is it easy to be confident as
to what is right in the particular case. The man who is just, having the
habit, does not find it easy to act unjustly.

What we must call equity may be opposed to justice, but only in the
legal sense of that term. It is justice freed from the errors incidental
to the particular case, for which the law cannot provide. Injustice,
again, is found in self-injury or suicide; which the law penalises, not
because the individual thereby treats himself unjustly, but because he
does an injustice to the community. It is only by metaphor that a man
may be called unjust to himself, an expression which means that the
relation between one part of him and another part of him is analogous to
the unjust relation between persons.

_IV.--WISDOM, PRUDENCE AND CONTINENCE_

The ensuing discussion of intellectual virtue requires some remarks on
the soul. We distinguish in the rational part, that which knows,
concerned, with the unchanging; and that which reasons, concerned with
the changing. Our intellects and our propensions--not our
sense-perceptions, which are shared with animals--guide our actions and
our apprehension of truth. Attraction and repulsion, in correspondence
with affirmation and denial, combine to form right choice; the
practical--as opposed to the pure--reason having an external object, and
being a motive power.

There are five modes of attaining truth: (1) Concerning things
unalterable, defined as demonstrative science; (2) concerning the making
of things changeable, art; (3) concerning the doing--not making--of
things changeable, prudence; (4) intuitive reason, the basis of
demonstrative science; (5) wisdom, the union of intuitive reason and
science.

Wisdom and prudence are the two virtues of the intellect. Wisdom implies
intuitive reason, which grasps undemonstrable first principles; it is
concerned with the interests not of the moment, the individu