ourage either to order a surrender, or to provoke
real warfare by reinforcing the place. In vain did the unfortunate Major
Anderson seek distinct instructions; the replies which he received were
contradictory and more obscure than Delphic oracles. This unfair,
vacillating, and contemptible conduct indicated the desire to lay upon
him alone the whole responsibility of the situation, with a politic and
selfish reservation to the government of the advantage of disavowing and
discrediting him, whatever he might do. On January 9 a futile effort at
communication was made by the steamer Star of the West; it failed, and
left matters worse rather than better. On March 3, 1861, the Confederate
government put General Beauregard in command at Charleston, thereby
emphasizing the resolution to have Sumter ere long. Such was the
situation on March 4, when Mr. Lincoln came into control and declared a
policy which bound him to "hold, occupy, and possess" Sumter. On the
same day there came a letter from Major Anderson, describing his
position. There were shut up in the fort together a certain number of
men and a certain quantity of biscuit and of pork; when the men should
have eaten the biscuit and the pork, which they would probably do in
about four weeks, they would have to go away. The problem thus became
direct, simple, and urgent.

Lincoln sought an opinion from Scott, and was told that "evacuation
seems almost inevitable." He requested a more thorough investigation,
and a reply to specific questions: "To what point of time can Anderson
maintain his position in Sumter? Can you, with present means, relieve
him in that time? What additional means would enable you to do so?" The
general answered that four months would be necessary to prepare the
naval force, and an even longer time to get together the 5000 regular
troops and 20,000 volunteers that would be needed, to say nothing of
obtaining proper legislation from Congress. Equally discouraging were
the opinions of the cabinet officers. On March 15 Lincoln put to them
the question: "Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumter,
under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it?" Only Chase and
Blair replied that it would be wise; Seward, Cameron, Wells, Smith, and
Bates were against it.

The form of this question indicated that Lincoln contemplated a
possibility of being compelled to recede from the policy expressed in
his inaugural. Yet it was not his temperament to ab