. The French forces,
commanded by the Scotsman Stuart d'Aubigny, consisted largely of Swiss
pikemen, and of their own men-at-arms. With his veterans of the
Granadine war, foot soldiers armed with sword and buckler, or arquebuses
and crossbows, and light cavalry, trained to unsleeping vigilance,
capable of long marches, and of an endurance unparalleled among the
soldiers of the time, he could carry on a guerrillero warfare which wore
down his opponents, who suffered far more than the Spaniards from the
heat. But he saw clearly that this was not enough. His experience in
Seminara showed him that something more was wanted on the battlefield.
The action was lost mainly because King Ferdinand, disregarding the
advice of Gonzalo, persisted in fighting a pitched battle with inferior
numbers, some of whom were untrustworthy Neapolitans. The Spanish foot
behaved excellently, but the result showed that in the open field their
loose formation and their swords put them at a disadvantage as against a
charge of heavy cavalry or pikemen. Gonzalo therefore introduced a much
more strict formation, and adopted the pike as the weapon of a part of
his foot. The division of the Spanish infantry into the "battle" or main
central body of pikemen, and the wings (_alas_) of "shot" to be employed
in outflanking the enemy, was primarily due to the Great Captain.

The French were expelled by 1498 without another battle. When the Great
Captain reappeared in Italy he had first to perform the congenial task
of driving the Turk from Cephalonia, then to aid in robbing the king of
Naples, Frederick, brother of his old ally Ferdinand. When the king of
Naples had been despoiled, the French and Spaniards quarrelled over the
booty. The Great Captain now found himself with a much outnumbered army
in the presence of the French. The war was divided into two phases very
similar to one another. During the end of 1502 and the early part of
1503 the Spaniards stood at bay in the entrenched camp at Barletta near
the Ofanto on the shores of the Adriatic. He resolutely refused to be
tempted into battle either by the taunts of the French or the discontent
of his own soldiers. Meanwhile he employed the Aragonese partisans in
the country, and flying expeditions of his own men, to harass the
enemy's communications. When he was reinforced, and the French committed
the mistake of scattering their forces too much to secure supplies, he
took the offensive, pounced on the enem