nality has on more
than one occasion directed the course of world politics, and has
helped to save Europe from an impending catastrophe. For more than an
hour the speaker discussed with me, if an almost uninterrupted
monologue may be called a discussion, the anxious problems of modern
Germany. Without reticence or afterthought, he gave me the benefit of
his mature wisdom and of a lifelong experience.
[23] Written in the spring of 1914.
I.
You ask me to give you the key of the international situation. That
key is in Germany, or rather in Berlin. For Prussia controls Germany,
and will more and more control it in the future.
The Germans are nervous and uneasy, and that is why they ceaselessly
increase their armaments. They are nervous because the whole European
situation has been radically changed, to their detriment. The whole
balance of power has been upset by the results of the Balkan War. They
are nervous because they are tragically isolated. Germany has no
friends, no allies, and has therefore to defend herself on two, or
rather on three, fronts. She has to defend herself at once against
France, against Russia, and against England.
It is true that the Triple Alliance still subsists. But it subsists
only in name. For Germany can count neither on Italy nor on Austria.
She cannot count on Italy. For Italy is a hopeless coquette, and she
transfers her erratic affections wherever her interest leads her. Nor
can Germany count on Austria. No longer can Austria be called the
"loyal secundant." For Austria has ceased to be controlled by her
Teutonic population. She is at the mercy of the Slavs, both inside and
outside of her empire. She is abandoned by Roumania, who is seeking
the support of Russia. She is detested by the Serbians, who have the
best organized army in the Balkans. It would have been the vital
interest of Austria to win over Serbia, and it would have been so easy
to win her over. An equitable treaty of commerce, the concession of a
port on the Adriatic, and Serbia would have become the ally of
Austria. Serbia was prepared to forget the shameful policy hitherto
pursued by Austria. All that was required was some give-and-take, some
fairness.
II.
But that sense of fairness, of international equity, is exactly what
both Prussia and Austria are so lamentably deficient in. The
Austrians, like the Prussians, may be individually most pleasant.
Politically and collectively they are consistently d
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