eds._

The granaries of Rome not sufficing to meet a famine with which the city
was visited, a certain Spurius Melius, a very wealthy citizen for these
days, privately laid in a supply of corn wherewith to feed the people at
his own expense; gaining thereby such general favour with the commons,
that the senate, apprehending that his bounty might have dangerous
consequences, in order to crush him before he grew too powerful,
appointed a dictator to deal with him and caused him to be put to death.

Here we have to note that actions which seem good in themselves and
unlikely to occasion harm to any one, very often become hurtful, nay,
unless corrected in time, most dangerous for a republic. And to treat
the matter with greater fulness, I say, that while a republic can never
maintain itself long, or manage its affairs to advantage, without
citizens of good reputation, on the other hand the credit enjoyed by
particular citizens often leads to the establishment of a tyranny. For
which reasons, and that things may take a safe course, it should be so
arranged that a citizen shall have credit only for such behaviour as
benefits, and not for such as injures the State and its liberties. We
must therefore examine by what ways credit is acquired. These, briefly,
are two, public or secret. Public, when a citizen gains a great name by
advising well or by acting still better for the common advantage. To
credit of this sort we should open a wide door, holding out rewards both
for good counsels and for good actions, so that he who renders such
services may be at once honoured and satisfied. Reputation acquired
honestly and openly by such means as these can never be dangerous. But
credit acquired by secret practices, which is the other method spoken
of, is most perilous and prejudicial. Of such secret practices may be
instanced, acts of kindness done to this or the other citizen in lending
him money, in assisting him to marry his daughters, in defending him
against the magistrates, and in conferring such other private favours as
gain men devoted adherents, and encourage them after they have obtained
such support, to corrupt the institutions of the State and to violate
its laws.

A well-governed republic, therefore, ought, as I have said, to throw
wide the door to all who seek public favour by open courses, and to
close it against any who would ingratiate themselves by underhand means.
And this we find was done in Rome. For the Roman rep