ions, and resuscitate an affront which he has once
allowed to rest.

TITLE V. OF QUASI-DELICTAL OBLIGATIONS

The obligation incurred by a judge who delivers an unjust or partial
decision cannot properly be called delictal, and yet it does not arise
from contract; consequently, as he cannot but be held to have done a
wrong, even though it may be due to ignorance, his liability would seem
to be quasidelictal, and a pecuniary penalty will be imposed on him at
the judge's discretion.

1 Another case of quasidelictal obligation is that of a person from
whose residence, whether it be his own, or rented, or gratuitously lent
him, anything is thrown or poured out whereby another is injured; the
reason why his liability cannot properly be called delictal being that
it is usually incurred through the fault of some other person, such as
a slave or freedman. Of a similar character is the obligation of one who
keeps something placed or hung over a public way, which might fall and
injure any one. In this last case the penalty has been fixed at ten
aurei; in that of things thrown or poured out of a dwelling-house the
action is for damages equivalent to double the loss sustained, though
if a free man be thereby killed the penalty is fixed at fifty aurei, and
even if he be merely injured he can sue for such damages as the judge
shall in his discretion award; and here the latter should take into
account the medical and other expenses of the plaintiff's illness, as
well as the loss which he has sustained through being disabled from
work.

2 If a son in power lives apart from his father, and anything is thrown
or poured out of his place of residence, or if he has anything so placed
or hung as to be dangerous to the public, it is the opinion of Julian
that no action lies against the father, but that the son should be made
sole defendant; and the same principle should be applied to a son in
power who is made a judge, and delivers an unjust or partial decision.

3 Similarly shipowners, inn and stable keepers are liable as on a
quasi-delict for wilful damage or theft committed in their ships, inns,
or stables, provided the act be done by some or one of their servants
there employed, and not by themselves; for the action which is given in
such cases is not based on contract, and yet as they are in some sense
at fault for employing careless or dishonest servants, their liability
would seem to be quasidelictal. In such circumstances th