the false lights which might lead it into
the mazes of doubtful law and of questionable propriety, and adhere
rigidly and sternly to the rule, which has been its guide, of doing only
that which is right and honest and of good report. The question of
according or of withholding rights of belligerency must be judged in
every case in view of the particular attending facts. Unless justified
by necessity, it is always, and justly, regarded as an unfriendly act
and a gratuitous demonstration of moral support to the rebellion. It is
necessary, and it is required, when the interests and rights of another
government or of its people are so far affected by a pending civil
conflict as to require a definition of its relations to the parties
thereto. But this conflict must be one which will be recognized in the
sense of international law as war. Belligerence, too, is a fact. The
mere existence of contending armed bodies and their occasional conflicts
do not constitute war in the sense referred to. Applying to the existing
condition of affairs in Cuba the tests recognized by publicists and
writers on international law, and which have been observed by nations
of dignity, honesty, and power when free from sensitive or selfish and
unworthy motives, I fail to find in the insurrection the existence of
such a substantial political organization, real, palpable, and manifest
to the world, having the forms and capable of the ordinary functions of
government coward its own people and to other states, with courts for
the administration of justice, with a local habitation, possessing such
organization of force, such material, such occupation of territory,
as to take the contest out of the category of a mere rebellious
insurrection or occasional skirmishes and place it on the terrible
footing of war, to which a recognition of belligerency would aim to
elevate it. The contest, moreover, is solely on land; the insurrection
has not possessed itself of a single seaport whence it may send forth
its flag, nor has it any means of communication with foreign powers
except through the military lines of its adversaries. No apprehension
of any of those sudden and difficult complications which a war upon
the ocean is apt to precipitate upon the vessels, both commercial and
national, and upon the consular officers of other powers calls for the
definition of their relations to the parties to the contest. Considered
as a question of expediency, I regard the accord