ritish
mobilizations, one thing stands out clearly, viz., that Germany was
ready and Britain unready, while, on the other hand, Germany had to
move 4,000,000 men and England only 100,000. To offset this, Britain
had to mobilize stores and supplies, not only for her own 100,000
expeditionary force, but for a large part of the armies of France
and for all the armies of Belgium. Even the very motor busses that
carried French troops from Paris to the Belgian frontier were
largely English, two cargoes of 100 vehicles each being rushed
across the English Channel on the same day.

The food question for the Belgian army and for the French armies on
the Belgian frontier was acute at the opening of the war, France was
ready and prepared to handle any eventuality in the way of supplies
that might be needed on the Belfort-Verdun line, but she was not
prepared for the conditions in the rear of the Belgian frontier.
Britain came to the support of France and Belgium without a day's
delay. She rushed food and munitions to the front, and on one
occasion Kitchener fed two French army corps, or 80,000 troops, for
eleven days without the slightest hitch. A moment's thought will
show that this means not only the ability to send food, but also to
organize the entire mechanism of the preparing and handling of that
food.

This was made possible largely by what was known in Britain as the
motor-lorry system, unlike that of any other army, introduced in
1911. Horse transport was relegated solely to the work of
distributing, the conveyance of supplies to the areas occupied being
performed wholly by motor transport. As the daily run of a motor
lorry may be put at 100 miles, it follows that an army could advance
fifty miles from its railhead and still be easily served with food
and ammunition. Thus, for the first time in the history of war, the
British army had devised a system whereby fresh meat and bread could
be supplied daily to a distant army. If, as the Germans declared,
the British soldier thought more of his food than fight, this desire
at least had the effect of keeping the supply system to the topmost
notch. The same principle was used for ammunition columns, in no
case any of the men from the front being detailed in the work of
looking after munitions or supplies. Thus, while British
mobilization of men consisted mainly of the expeditionary force of
100,000, the British mobilization of auxiliary columns for aiding
the supply system o