FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   279   280   281   282   283   284   285   286   287   288   289   290   291   292   293   294   295   296   297   298   299   300   301   302   303  
304   305   306   307   308   309   310   311   312   313   314   315   316   317   318   319   320   321   322   323   324   325   326   327   328   >>   >|  
y of classification there must be a corresponding difficulty of definition. It has been proposed in such cases to substitute a Type for a Definition; to select some variety of a species, or species of a genus, as exhibiting its character in an eminent degree, and to regard other groups as belonging to the same species or genus, according as they agree more with this type than with other types representing other species or genera. But the selection of one group as typical implies a recognition of its attributes as prevailing generally (though not universally) throughout the species or genus; and to recognise these attributes and yet refuse to enumerate them in a definition, seems to be no great gain. To enumerate the attributes of the type as an Approximate Definition of the species or genus, true of _most_ of the groups constituting the species or genus, answers the same purpose, is more explicit, and can mislead no one who really attends to the exposition. An approximate definition is, indeed, less misleading than the indication of a type; for the latter method seems to imply that the group which is now typical has a greater permanence or reality than its co-ordinate groups; whereas, for aught we know, one of the outside varieties or species may even now be superseding and extinguishing it. But the statement of a definition as approximate, is an honest confession that both the definition and the classification are (like a provisional hypothesis) merely the best account we can give of the matter according to our present knowledge. Sec. 7. The limits of Definition are twofold: (a) A name whose meaning cannot be analysed cannot be defined. This limitation meets us only in dealing with the names of the metaphysical parts or simple qualities of objects under the second requisite of a Terminology. Resistance and weight, colour and its modes, many names of sounds, tastes, smells, heat and cold--in fact, whatever stands for an unanalysable perception, cannot be made intelligible to any one who has not had experience of the facts denoted; they cannot be defined, but only exemplified. A sort of genetic definition may perhaps be attempted, as if we say that colour is the special sensation of the cones of the retina, or that blue is the sensation produced by a ray of light vibrating about 650,000,000,000,000 times a second; but such expressions can give no notion of our meaning to a blind man, or to any one who has never seen a
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   279   280   281   282   283   284   285   286   287   288   289   290   291   292   293   294   295   296   297   298   299   300   301   302   303  
304   305   306   307   308   309   310   311   312   313   314   315   316   317   318   319   320   321   322   323   324   325   326   327   328   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

species

 

definition

 
groups
 

Definition

 
attributes
 

approximate

 

defined

 

typical

 

enumerate

 

sensation


meaning

 
colour
 

classification

 

knowledge

 
objects
 
Terminology
 
matter
 

weight

 

Resistance

 
qualities

requisite
 

present

 

limitation

 

analysed

 
twofold
 
metaphysical
 

limits

 

dealing

 

simple

 

experience


produced
 

retina

 

special

 

vibrating

 

notion

 

expressions

 

attempted

 

stands

 

smells

 
sounds

tastes

 
unanalysable
 
perception
 

denoted

 

exemplified

 
genetic
 

account

 
intelligible
 

permanence

 
implies