hods of prosecution introduced on
one occasion, may be practised on another; and that in the natural
rotations of power, the same means may be used for very different ends.
Nothing is more probable, my lords, if a bill of this kind should be
ever passed, in compliance with the clamours of the people, to punish
ministers, and to awe the court, than that it may in time, if a wicked
minister should arise, be made a precedent for measures by which the
court may intimidate the champions of the people; by which those may be
pursued to destruction, who have been guilty of no other crime than that
of serving their country in a manner which those who are ignorant of the
circumstances of affairs, happen to disapprove.

The measures now proposed, my lords, are, therefore, to be rejected,
because it is evident that they will establish a precedent, by which
virtue may at any time be oppressed, but which can be very seldom
necessary for the detection of wickedness; since there is no probability
that it will often happen, that a man really guilty of enormous crimes
can secure himself from discovery, or connect others with him in such a
manner, that they cannot impeach him without betraying themselves.

But, my lords, whenever virtue is to be persecuted, whenever false
accusations are to be promoted, this method is incontestably useful; for
no reward can so efficaciously prevail upon men who languish in daily
fear of publick justice, as a grant of impunity.

It may be urged, my lords, I own, that all inquiries into futurity are
idle speculations; that the expedient proposed is proper on the present
occasion, and that no methods of justice are to be allowed, if the
possibility of applying them to bad purposes, is a sufficient reason for
rejecting them.

But to this, my lords, it may be answered with equal reason, that every
process of law is likewise, in some degree, defective; that the
complications of circumstances are variable without end, and, therefore,
cannot be comprised in any certain rule; and that we must have no
established method of justice, if we cannot be content with such as may
possibly be sometimes eluded.

And, my lords, it may be observed farther, that scarcely any practice
can be conceived, however generally unreasonable and unjust, which may
not be sometimes equitable and proper; and that if we are to lay aside
all regard to futurity, and act merely with regard to the present
exigence, it may be often proper to