working. Every people?
Surely not, remarked unbiased onlookers. The Egyptians, the Irish, the
Austrians, the Persians, to name but four among many, are disqualified
for the exercise of these indefeasible rights. Perhaps with good reason?
Then modify the doctrine. Why this difference of treatment? they
queried. Is it not because the supreme judge knows full well that Great
Britain would not brook the discussion of the Egyptian or the Irish
problem, and that France, in order to feel quite secure, must hinder the
Austrian-Germans from coalescing with their brethren of the Reich? But
if Britain and France have the right to veto every self-denying measure
that smacks of disruption or may involve a sacrifice, why is Russia
bereft of it? If the principle involved be of any value at all, its
application must be universal. To an equal all-round distribution of
sacrifice the only alternative is the supremacy of force in the service
of arbitrary rule. And to this force, accordingly, the Supreme Council
had recourse. The only cases in which it seriously vindicated the rights
of oppressed or dissatisfied peoples to self-determination against the
will of the ruling race or nation were those in which that race or
nation was powerless to resist. Whenever Britain or France's interests
were deemed to be imperiled by the putting in force of any of the
Fourteen Points, Mr. Wilson desisted from its application. Thus it came
about that Russia was put on the same plane with Germany and received
similar, in some respects, indeed, sterner, treatment. The Germans were
at least permitted to file objections to the conditions imposed and to
point out flaws in the arrangements drafted, and their representations
sometimes achieved their end. It was otherwise with the Russians. They
were never consulted. And when their representatives in Paris
respectfully suggested that all such changes as might be decided upon by
the Great Powers during their country's political disablement should be
taken to be provisional and be referred for definite settlement to the
future constituent assembly, the request was ignored.

Of psychological rather than political interest was Mr. Wilson's
conscientious hesitation as to whether the nationalities which he was
preparing to liberate were sufficiently advanced to be intrusted with
self-government. As stated elsewhere, his first impulse would seem to
have been to appoint mandatories to administer the territories severed
fr